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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3476 
 
_____________ 
 
 
OSAMA “SAM” ELFEKY, 
   Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;  
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
 DIRECTOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;  
 UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;  
 EVANGELIA KLAPAKIS, Director, Philadelphia Field Office,  
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
 LAURA B. ZUCHOWSKI, Director, Vermont Service Center,  
 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-15-cv-03442) 
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2018  
_____________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 19, 2018) 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 After filing a complaint and amended complaint in the District Court pursuant to 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Osama “Sam” Elfeky 
voluntarily disclosed several decisions made by the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS” or the “agency”), which determined that he had entered 
into a fraudulent marriage with a United States citizen to evade immigration laws.  He 
now appeals from the District Court’s order denying his petition to seal those judicial 
records.  We will affirm. 
I. Facts & Procedural Background 
 Elfeky commenced this action in 2015 to challenge numerous adverse decisions 
made by USCIS as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C.  
§ 706(2)(A).  The complaint was a result of USCIS’s determination that Elfeky had 
entered into a marriage with a United States citizen, Kimberly D., “for the sole purpose of 
evading immigration laws.”  SA103.  In initiating suit, Elfeky filed a complaint and 
amended complaint that described his immigration status, the various forms of relief he 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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had petitioned for, and the several agency adjudications forming the basis of his 
complaint.  These pleadings were filed on the public docket.  
 Subsequently, the parties filed a joint motion requesting the District Court to seal 
the administrative record.  The parties reasoned that the record should be sealed because 
it contained “2,789 pages of sensitive personal information relating to Elfeky, including 
information that underlies the agency’s conclusion that he committed marriage fraud.”  
SA55.  They acknowledged that “[m]uch of this information would require redaction 
under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1.3, including personal identifiers such as Social 
Security numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers, and tax records.”  SA55-56.  
The parties agreed that, “[t]o ensure maximum public access to these proceedings,” they 
would file the agency decisions with their motions for summary judgment and would 
make summary judgment briefing “available to the public.”  SA56.  They also agreed that 
the District Court’s decision on summary judgment would “fully inform the public of the 
nature of the proceeding, further diminishing the public interest in the administrative 
record standing alone.”  SA56.  The District Court granted the motion to seal the 
administrative record, permitting the parties to proceed to summary judgment. 
 After reviewing the papers, the District Court issued a memorandum opinion and 
order entering judgment in favor of USCIS.  The opinion was published in the Federal 
Supplement.  Elfeky v. Johnson, 232 F. Supp. 3d 695 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  In the opinion, and 
pertinent to this case, the District Court noted, inter alia, that “USCIS possessed 
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substantial evidence that Elfeky’s marriage to Kimberly D. was fraudulent, including 
Kimberly D.’s own admission against interest, detailed testimony concerning the 
circumstances of the marriage, Elfeky’s use of an attorney who engaged in a marriage 
fraud scheme, and evidence that Elfeky and Kimberly D. never cohabitated.”  Id. at 706.  
The District Court also determined that Elfeky “committed fraud and willfully 
misrepresented a material fact” when he filed an application before USCIS.  Id. at 707.  
Elfeky did not appeal this decision. 
 Instead, nearly eight months later, Elfeky filed a petition in the District Court to 
seal the record, docket, and all filings.  Elfeky averred that the aforementioned opinion 
was “available not only on the publicly accessible electronic docket; but also on the 
internet upon a rudimentary search” of his name, and that the “publicly available” 
opinion, docket, and pleadings “have caused [him] harm and prejudice.”  SA194.  As a 
result, Elfeky continued, he has suffered “[l]ost business opportunities both in the United 
States and abroad” and “[r]isk to his personal safety because of [his] asylum status being 
public information.”  Id.   
 The District Court denied Elfeky’s petition.  In an order, the court noted that 
Elfeky “voluntarily placed the issues on the public docket when he filed his Complaint 
and Amended Complaint,” and emphasized that what he “seeks is contrary to what was 
agreed to in the joint motion of the parties to seal the administrative record.”  App. 5-6.  
The District Court, nonetheless, carefully weighed the factors relevant to granting orders 
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of confidentiality.  Accordingly, it concluded that Elfeky “ha[d] failed to establish good 
cause for sealing under [our] framework.”  App. 5.  The District Court also rejected 
Elfeky’s argument “regarding the need to seal the record based on his asylum status” 
because he had “disclosed his asylum status years ago when he filed this lawsuit.”  App. 
6.  This timely appeal followed.  
II. Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C.    
§ 706.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
III. Discussion 
 At the outset, we note that it appears Elfeky conflates his arguments that the 
District Court erred in denying his petition to seal the judicial records and in deciding the 
petition without a hearing.  We therefore begin by analyzing the issue of whether the 
District Court erred in denying the petition to seal the judicial records and then proceed to 
determine if the District Court erred in deciding the petition without a hearing. 
 Elfeky contends that he has proffered sufficient evidence to show good cause to 
seal the judicial records and that, in balancing the Pansy factors, the privacy interests are 
in his favor.  He also argues that the District Court erred in placing weight on the fact 
“that the parties had previously agreed to lift the seal that had been in place.”  Elfeky Br. 
7.  According to him, the harm he alleges was not discovered until the seal was lifted.   
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We review a district court’s decision to seal judicial records for abuse of 
discretion.  See EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 694 F.3d 351, 361 (3d Cir. 2012).  “Courts have 
‘inherent equitable power’ to grant orders of confidentiality upon a showing of good 
cause.”  EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287, 302 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pansy v. 
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785–86 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Good cause is proven by 
a showing that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party 
seeking closure.”  Id. (quoting Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786).  The allegations articulated must 
be specific and sufficiently detailed:  “‘[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by 
specific examples or articulated reasoning,’ do not support a good cause showing.”  Id. 
(alteration added) (quoting Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786).  The party petitioning the court bears 
the burden of justifying confidentiality.  Kronos, 620 F.3d at 302. 
In Pansy, we set out a non-exhaustive list of factors that balance public interest 
against private interest in deciding whether a party has established good cause to seal 
judicial records.  23 F.3d at 787–89.  The following are several factors we consider as 
part of a showing of good cause: 
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 
 
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate 
purpose or an improper purpose; 
 
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 
embarrassment; 
 
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information 
important to public health and safety; 
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5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will 
promote fairness and efficiency; 
 
6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality 
is a public entity or official; and 
 
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public. 
 
Kronos, 620 F.3d at 302 (quoting Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1995)).  A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to conduct a good cause 
balancing test before adjudicating the matter.  Pansy, 23 F.3d at 792. 
The District Court properly set forth the Pansy factors and explained how they 
weighed in this case.  The court found that Elfeky “failed to establish good cause for 
sealing” under the Pansy framework in part because he “voluntarily placed” the 
information on the public docket when he filed the complaints and “again when he filed 
his motion for summary judgment.”  App. 5.  The District Court rejected Elfeky’s 
averments related to “unspecified ‘lost business opportunities’” and his personal safety as 
“insufficient to warrant sealing,” reasoning that the “public is entitled to know about a 
case that involves public officials, a federal agency, and the [District] Court’s resolution 
of a dispute concerning immigration issues.”  App. 5-6.  Moreover, the District Court 
highlighted that Elfeky’s request was “contrary to what was agreed to in the” parties’ 
motion to seal the administrative record.  App. 6.  Similarly, the District Court overruled 
Elfelky’s argument on the need to seal based on his asylum status, explaining that he had 
already “disclosed his asylum status years ago when he filed this lawsuit,” and that 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 “exempts immigration cases, including this one, from 
electronic public access.”  Id. 
 We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that Elfeky 
failed to establish good cause under the Pansy framework.  We agree that the record 
demonstrates several instances where Elfeky affirmatively discloses information he now 
attempts to seal.  Furthermore, we also concur with the District Court’s determination 
that Elfeky’s unspecified allegations of lost business opportunities and fear for his 
personal safety were insufficient to establish good cause because “‘[b]road allegations of 
harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,’ do not support a 
good cause showing.”  Kronos, 620 F.3d at 302 (alteration added) (quoting Pansy, 23 
F.3d at 786).  Indeed, Elfeky has not clearly defined or articulated a particularized 
example of the harm he has suffered due to this information being available to the public.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court exercised appropriate discretion in 
denying Elfeky’s petition. 
 Elfeky further argues that the District Court’s resolution is “problematic because 
[he] was never given [the] opportunity” of a hearing.  Elfeky Br. 8.  He contends that he 
was not given an opportunity to respond to the Government’s assertions because the 
District Court decided the petition three days after the Government’s response.   
 We acknowledge that district courts have broad discretion to decide a motion with 
or without oral argument, and our review of those decisions is for an abuse of that broad 
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discretion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1989).  Here, Elfeky does not point to anything in the record to demonstrate how the 
District Court abused its discretion in not holding oral argument to decide the petition or 
in deciding the motion three days after the Government filed its response.  Likewise, our 
independent review satisfies us that the District Court acted well within its discretion to 
decide the motion without oral argument and in an appropriate timeframe.  
 Thus, we will affirm. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we shall affirm the order of the District Court denying 
Elfeky’s petition to seal the record, docket, and all filings in this matter. 
